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•« viable dcmocrati d an effective for
policy irreconcilable aims?"
It is significant of these times that such a question would
be propounded as a subject for inquiry. It stands as an indict-
ment of the political union that is the United States. Its
asking betrays a current anxiety and doubt that is fundamental
and ifithout precedent. It is a solicitation Tor a pottage of
comfort that would pass as quickly as fisau's dinner and for the
sane ;rice. Essential, then, is an examination of the Ma
such an asking, of the meaning of "viable democratic government,"
of "effective foreign policy," and of the extraordinary complex
environment within which so many elements interact.
Perception of the environment within which international
passions interact is most crucial to an effective understanding
and a prerequisite of effective action international.'- -.
no other environment is so subject to such a variety of views
concurrently held and concurrently utilised. A datum, necessarily
arbitrary;, is needed for perception and examination of -
environment. The selected datum is sition of the united

States established as a product ox the many events of recent history
which events are the elements of this environment.
The initial element in the t setting is the United
Str olitical involvement. Mill /riad of nations. These
involvements constituted a severe with -African tradition in
foreign affaire* President on's injunction, "to aafe Mltil
^foreign nations/ as little ,>olitical connection as peeeible,"
was followed well and for, prhaps, lvoo long. Oaly rarely would
the United States act in concert with other nations politically,
and then only with severe limitations in time and scope. The
reasons for this jealously guarded independence are many, but this
independent path was kept.
riited State! joined with other nations the prosecution
of World War I. Many goals were established and some, for a time,
were achieved. This temporary alliance use considered otory
in its temporary quality for the option to pursue furtl-
ailiance in the League c. bob was refused. The Unite.
returned to its solitary path.
The advent of World War o&etratec -ire
of the political mechanic the 1930' s, internationally, to
prevent large scale war. The i 1 .. in the past inspired in 19l
a profound break with the .tion of action alone,
iator Connally proposed a resolution co/amitting L i s
1# Woods, ft. L. , A Treasury ox the Jamiliar, p* 61

to an international peace kee. .thority. The resolution was
approved by the Senate by an overwhelming majority, 85 to 5>. The
Senate had been the traditional obstacle to the creation of
political bonds with other nations* It had been the senate that had
arrested progress toward political ties within the League of Nations.
The Senate, potpourri of opinions, principles, and interests., changed.
The change in the Senate .narked more than 85 Americans
convinced of a new internationalism. These men, often considered
the most difficult of men to persuade, were men who keenly gauged
opinions and feelings of the country at large. More than a
conviction in the mind of the Chief Executive, the chief agent in
foreign affairs, the action signalled a movement by the country and
solid backing for the course of concerted action with oUier nations.
Concerted action politically became a new cornerstone of
American policy. Commitment to the United Nations followed the war
and has continued. In the wake of World \iar II a new world split
became apparent. The USSR demonstrated a taste for the acquisition
of neighboring governments which taste in the eyes of many viewers
would be sated only with the seven continents. As this became rore
apparent and pressures grew and the united Nations Organization
demonstrated certain limitations, the United States commenced
creating an alliance structure of homeric proportions. Nation after
nation was added to the roll of allies of the United States and of
those whom the United States would fight to defend. From 1939,
2* Brockway, T. t* (ed) Basic documents in ifaited ot^tes Foreign
Policy, p. 136.
tq» *4$
when no such commitment to another nation existed, to 1959 over U3
nations came under the mantle of American power. -* The treaties
negotiated vary in provision and in the manner in which they have
been executed. Supplementary ts have been, signed adding
to the substance or effectiveness of the initial agreements. The
United States has certainly sono discretion a3 do its allies in
interpretation of action to be taken but the many conimltrasnts
remain. Although the United States has a substantial alliance
structure less freedom of action is available to American leader-
ship.
A second element is a corollary of the first, the problem of
Maiobality." "Globality" involves :uore than the operating limita-
tions on action internationally generated by the multiplicity of
treaty commitments. It includes such restrictions but exceeds them.
It applies not only to American relations with allied nations in
matters subject of treaty agreements but other matters and other
nations as well. Globality is the handicap produced by immense
American power in a very small world. It is the present inability
of the United States to act on a single issue in one part of the
world or with one country without that action affecting for good
or ill American relations in other parts of the world. Appreciable
increases or decreases in economic aid in Asia are followed by
questions in -Latin America. Direct American action around Cuba
brought approval from ^est Germany and reproof from India.^ Little
3# Includes RIO, NATO, K), ANZUS pacts plus Japan,
South Korea, and China (Taiwan) but not the EO pro!
Cuba included under RIO Treaty for that time* i')epartment of State
Treaties in Force , January 1, 1962*
U. -few York Times , western Edition, October 29, 196,:, p« 20
.)
ibtAtnm* "O^H
5action is 7;ossible without & careful African estimate of the costs
and reactions through 360 degrees of longitude.
The use of "most favored nation" clauses meant in principle
the same thing but the African aggregation of power expanded what once
were minor items into vital issues, if not for the United States, I hen
for the smaller nations of the world, Globality has done more than
simply reduce the options available to American statesmen. It has
added a moderating element. As American power has increased so has the
value of the prizes of action, the stakes. As the stakes have increased
so have then the penalties of error. A f-reater prise may be more tempting,
but a greater penalty is more sobering, and that sobering effect serv 2
to moderate American actions both in severity and in speed of execution.
A third element is the compression of time as a dimension in
the conduct of foreign affairs, statements must often be given in reply
to events or statements abroad villi the minimum time for research and
consideration, for failure to comment could be as damaging or more
damaging than a statement less judicious than desired. Time is required
too to Inform the Congress and the country of new information and new
needs in foreign affairs. The informing process serves several ends.
It may reveal weaknesses in a new program which may be corrected
before too heavy a commitment is made and made in error. The
executive branch does have most extensive sources of information from
abroad and throughout the United States* If the information is
)perly handled the proper officials should be aware of it, but
significant analyses and ideas may originate from extragovenimental
sources and provide a significant contribution to the effectiveness
of government action.
£
S, Newsweek, March 18, 1963* p. >U, The rule of foreign Affairs
and the New York Times may be considered as well 3
MM
.
Hie informing process achieves other ends as well*
informing the country support for a particular policy Lfl j^J.a -a 'or
conversely is lost. The President or his designate may float"a
trial balloon," off hand remarks or a speech before a select group
of journalists or businessmen. After carefully watching rhe ats,
or remarks, and replies to that speech a measure of the degree of
support for the policy is taken, A3 th .;-at ecnbl o the
mea continues and influential speakers, possibly the President
himself, add their weight to the persuasion process. %$ this device
a sound measurement of the extant support for a policy may be derived
and also substantial support created,, Measurement and creation of
support are very expensive in time, and sufficient time may R
available to expend in this fashion*
A fourth element in the international setting is the extreme
potentcy of nuclear ordnance. The advent of such weapons has
radically altered the complexion of international political con-
siderations. The relative gradualness and moderation implicit in
the use of "conventional 11 ordnance ceases to exist in consideration
of nuclear arms. A substantial number of attacks deliver-'
a long period of time at grc_ would accomplish w:
conventional ordnance a fraction of what could be a<;
single mission with nuclear weapons. The nation attac .s little
time to evaluate the direction and relative success of its fighting
effort and make concessions riate to the situation.,
attacked nations have not before '^ea faced with extinction of
selves as nations nor With tantial minority or more of

their total populations beint; casualties. The railitar Lliaation
of nations with lengthy warnin ther nations is no longer re-
quired , for professional forces in oeing can ostensibly oondtuct
h on attack. While this but three nations at
present the future may well Mt this number swell.
Fallout from nuclear weapons is a difference more significant
than suddenness. The prospect of a possibly invisible "cloud" net
detectable by the human senses which "cloud" can sicken or kill in
varying periods of tia ttening than any si
The "bang" happens. One hears or tecs this. It passes, 'Die
landscape may be drastically altered but one who survives knows
it is over. One way pick up the pieces, fight, help, or join others
as men have done after fires, flood*, or other bombs. Fallout
alters this. It is the unknown which is more terrible than any
known. It is imprecise* A "bang" is aimed at MM*thing* The
"bang" may miss its target but is not borne willy-nilly by the wind
to fall wherever the vagaries of wind would have it. Fallout not
only may affect medically those exposed tc it but may cause an
inc in genetic mutations involving subsequent generation:;,
The most feared result of fallout is the complete elimination
of the human race. Man now is represented as having the pmutf
through many nuclear detonations to manufacture sufficient fallout
to cover the world thus resulting in 100/i human casualties, ily
when reference is made it is to *a annihilation,"' and the
6. An excellent description of the effects both physically and
biologically is in Glasstone, S., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
prepared by the Department of Defense and the AEG,
7. Stillraan, H. and Pfaff, W«, The New Politics
, p* 11*0

mechanics are left to the imagination. Mechanics aside, the by-
stander nation may receive fallout as well as a belligerent.
The bystander nation is far more involved with the actions
of thl ewers than ever befcre. She survival of t LI
nation (and the large) in the age of fallout is contingent on the
ability of the nuclear nations to resolve potential conflicts
without resort to nuclear war rather than being contingent on the
11 nation's barter of lie or economic assets for security.
International power in this sense is no longer ft function of rifle
bearers or factory floor space. On such a spectrum the smaller
nations could have their place however close to one end. How
these smaller nations can only -.Jatch impotent to exercise much
control in such matters so vitally affecting their destiny.
Mudear weapons, then, serve to magnify the impact of the
actions of the major (nuclear) powers. Whatever the dispute,
whatever the contention, the stakes have a tjurtax of tension,
A fifth element, directly related to the fourth, . a-
parity between the offensive and the defensive in current weapons
bona* The :ns employed to attack are far more effective in
delivery- of an attack than the weapons used for defense arc effective
in stopping an attack. If an attack is once launched by a nuclear
power the probability is quite high that severe damage will result
to the attacked. Research and d<r eat is still in process for
& practical method of counterin Histic missile attack.
ballistic missile fired toward a fixed target will fail to cl
that target as a result of & .ion. The missile itself

may malfunction. Individual missiles may have gross inaccuracies,
but usually V~> to 30 minutes after firing the warhead v/ill
8
detonate as desired by the firer. the defender fares somewhat
better in taking action against an attack by manned aircraft*
Many may be stopped, but if only a few succeed in delivery i ir
uaanon severe damage will accrue to the attacked. otential
of an attack upon cities is always available, Thus with the
short tine of flight of missiles, evacuation of cities la not very
feasible. Large segments of a nation's population, perhaps a
majority, are continually and hostage to an armed
attack by another nation from which their government can defend them
only by threat of retaliation rather than some direct counter
»
Each member of society has a direct and immediate interest In the
actions !a foreign affairs.
A sixth element is the severe fluctuation in American power
reletive to that of Russia that has occurred in the fifteen plus
years past. In 19u3> the United States was at a remarkable? height
of r/ower* Over 12 million men were under arms and over 109.
military aircraft were available for use.° By any quantat
measure the United states had more than the country had ever had
before, more almost regardless of we at was counted* A qualitative
difference existed as well. The Ufedtatf States was the sole
possessor of atomic bombs. Although an infinite number of
bombs may not have existed at that time, possession of just
caused a substantial gap between the power of the and
Turner, G, B. and Chalienr .
(
<. (ed) "Strategic arid
Political Implications of Missiles" in Turner and Challenger
Hational Security in the Suclear Ag^o.
9. Goldfiald, £. D. Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1962, p. 2$6
>t«h
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the of any other nation in the world including ia*
ther the United States should have or could have exercised
that power is moot. The rapl .iliz&tion of the American armed
forces after the defeat of Japan diminished I ui rea; w
substantially* A strong residue remained, hen could in
mobilised. factories could again shift production* Bat the old
measures of strength had been invalidated and the new mes ad
\, come into being. The American monopoly of nuclear fNMgMMM
was broken in 19U9 with the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear
device* One may question whether this first explosion was caused
by "a device" or an operational deliverable bomb, and at what
nts in time the Russians possessed what number of deliverable
bombs and delivery vehicles, i.e. when the Russians possessed a real
•rational capability*
with that 19li9 detonation the united States no longer stood
apart from all other nations* ^hile the United States built up
her arsenal in quantity, no longer was there the qualitative
difference in weapons between the two countries, Russia and the
United States* A certain element of parity began to appear* The
parity did not mean each country had an equal number of bombs, or
aircraft, or missiles* It meant that each country had the
capability of severely damaging the other to a degree as
beyond being acceptable, i.e.., damage costing less than value of
returns* The numbers of weapons became less significant for the
import of the numbers would be soa nt upon number and quality
of aircraft, number of targets, and other continually char and
'
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interacting variables. What • mmt significant wa it/ of
ability to impose s?ravo ftafltf an opponent, American power did
not diminish in actual q but the gap which had ..ly
exi. tween Russian and power was sever
-tage of a nuclear IT a non-nuclear- id
xist. The United States still' „ssed a substantial nuclear
arsenal. This did not vanish* ring supremacy was to
ven this was questioned in the "missile
controversy of i960,
A seventh element in the international setting is the
emergence of a large number o" independent nations that had not
;tod independently prior to World Jar II, Those Oil oaf
face sll the problems attendant upon political end economic develop-
ment. The problems them selves are not fresh hatched. In „st»
str,' ...I faced these problems aa they gradually • Laily
or thoroughly solving them in lively leisurely £1 „ In
the mw nations the problems have come to the fore in a abort
t time and solutions f TOWami are desired in a
ariod, creating substantial pressure for short cuta and
ck solutions. Governmental procedures slowly eve n the West from
the past - re cut., and tc the \ and to t&a times,
•aation and forms c ,', transferred to a nan-*
state aot always completely taken root which has ca-eated
dissatisfaction and added to the pressure. Desires for .;iic
development are also str ling these n&tioni; . .ok
financial assistance from t! ma
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to assist them. This desire for economic assistance is ft
restricted to the newer political entities but is shared by
countries who have been inde
.
t lor many years.
States is faced, then, with maay I or financial ftj .ce
from these countries and for c I assistance in .'onus.
An eighth element in the international setting is the i.on
of the world into recognisable camps. An arbitrary sharp line
bisecting the world neatly in two :^arts is more simple than accuracy
permits. It would be more accurate to observe that two magnetic
poles exist each having attractions of varying strengths for
lesser countries with some countries on the edges of the field
of force in some ways uninfluenced*
During the latter phases of World v*ar II the rtussian Army
secured for the Soviet Union hegemony over the states on the
Russian frontier. These actions created substantial doubts in
the united States and in non-liussian occupied Europe concerning
Russian intentions to abide by the principles of the Atlantic Citarter
endorsed by them in the United Nations Declaration of January, 19U2.
From these doubts grew suspicions and from these suspicions grc* a
conviction that a commitment existed to alter the political., economic,
and social conditions throughout the world j that this alteration
would be attempted by any means possible; and that the center of
support of this commitment could oe geographically located in the
capital of the Soviet Union. The impulse and motivation for this
10. p. dt ., p. 132
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cossnitment to alteration of the political, economic, and social
.
conditions throughout the world has been the subject 01 .ra
of writing and discussion primarily' cause it Is so central to
the times. The results of this commitment and the reaction to it
have fueled international affairs and caused major change* on the
face of the globe.
The action and reaction have primarily centered in the
Soviet "Union and in the United States although other nations as
well have individually exercised choice in the matter and have
taken stands as a result of their own appreciation of the situa-
tion and their own values. The American reaction to the Soviet
army's campaign in Eastern Europe and subsequent establishment
of governmental regimes patterned after the Soviet Union was
manyfold. One initial step was the conception and execution of
the Marshall Flan. Initially proposed at Harvard June 5 9 19h7$
notary of State Marshall later offered a many billion dollar
program designed to assist the European countries to repair war
d«nage, rebuild their industrial facilities* and revitalise their
anomies in order to preserve "their free society and the herita^
we share with them.* This reaction was primarily economic in
nature although heavy with political overtones.
/ction of a political nature was undertaken concurrently.
President Truman spoke to Congress in March, 19^7 asking for
authorisation and funds to aid m and Turkey in an economic vein,
11. Brookvay, op. cit . 3
.
Ik
to employ American military p* rsonnel in an advisory capacity, and
to train Greek and Turkish personnel in this country* President
Tri.tmari's speech was followed in July of that year v,\ wpy
for "Containment," forwardedby "a," George KgNmu The oolitic al
"containing" of the Soviet U&loa within xce
it had t?.»n retched became a fuxidamental element in .American
foreign policy. This element has continued witnouo major modifi-
cation »
Aid to Greece and lurkey was followed in 19h9 by the
creation of the ftorth Atlantic treaty Organisation, i'jie treaty
establishing (U30 was a profound step for the United iitat t Oat
United States had in war joined with other nations and had in peace
contributed considerable treasure for both economic and political
purposes. The funds previously provided contributed substantially
to the ability of toe European governments to provide ioi their
own stability and for their ise in the military tpkn
The United Spates had indicated a willingness u> ac& in concert
with others through tne united Nations for resolution of differences
reen nations. The American MWt had been a gnnivral one
of joint action. The accession to *UT0 was by no means so al,
but marKod a major increase in degree of entanglement, km armed
attack against one of the members of Aa£0 was to be considered as
an araed attack against all q bp»» Althougn the united
States was not specifically committed to mechanically go go war- in
event of an attack on Europe, the treaty certainly implied that
such would oe the case. The tfi: >tat«« brc. :az
12. Brockway, op. cit., p. I6h
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by having American troops stationed abroad in Europe in peacetiw
exclusive of occupation troops* With these troops were American
generals and these generals were in positions CGiwnandi opean
troops* A multi-nation armed force was organised on which a ient
footing ttfiich was without precedent in peacetime for the United
States* -*
As the politico-military ties with Europe grew and were
str ned, additional ties were solicited around the worl
The bonds that were formed had as their central theme the military
HUM of the territorial integrity of the nations involved. These
ties would include or be followed by agreements providing for the
assistance of the United States in training the armed forces of
such nations and the provision of iriilitary equipment* The dollar
value of military aid delivered abroad from 1$$Q through 1902 has
reached ^26 billion,-"hmich would indicate a substantial American
political commitment to t) 13 program* Not in all cases are
American troops garrisoned ir territory of the nation involved*
Ground troops, battle troops may not be employed* The defense
planned may rely on the retaliatory airpower of the Strategic Air
Command, on •-'. *W Naval Forces with marine units, or upon the newly
15'
created B< S« Strike Command* * The plans may include coordination
with units of allied nations such as in the NATO army» iniforr..
soldiers with flags in organised units crossing national borders
appears less popular than other methods of securing influence over
13* The rel ; Is , and the Marines J
considered*
ilj.* Toldfield, £• D. op* cit ,, p. 251
je, T. H* "fiesolution in the Pentagon", Look a
23 Jpril 1963, p* 31*
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new territory. Regardless of the means of defense the central .
theme of these agreements Mi a military theme, the t and
maintenance of sufficient t iiitary strength to forestall
any light assault or delay a he until the full weight of
American -rdlitary power ecu...
attacker.
The central group of one e.. lj one of v
poles, could be considered to be e. d of those nations
allied within the framework of the American military alliance
system. The central group of the other camp would be what is
termed th> ioc of nations, the members of tt ->aw
tj North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer dagnolia, and Communist
China* Other nations could be placed on the periphery of the two
©amps, attracted or repelled on the basis of indivl. jsues,
geography, and interests. Within each camp there are centripetal
and centrifugal forces continually interacting. The recent oxspute
within the Communist bloc between the Soviet Union and Goanaawiii
China is indicative oi' centrifugal forces at play in one camp and
General DeGaulle's actions in the ot,her«
tfeen these two pols run what may be termed "plane t of
conflict." These planes could oe interpreted as categories of
conflict as well, and serve to illustrate the occasions of diametric
16
osition when this opposition occurs.
16, Professor P. H. Seabury ecture, Contei rj£
Definition of the Cold War, 7 Jan* 1963* Politic.' .nee 12
^thods o:f* tin cold war. This s 4 tied
the writer to the "Plane of Conflict" approach follow!.
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The first piano of conflict is that wherein two major global
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in a largo measure
conflict as large powers have traditionally conflicted throughout
the worl* Sacft power attemots to add to its orbit other nations
to accumulate more power for (ha future. Sources of raw
materials for each must be guarded and future sources must bo
searched out and garnered. Nations immediate!:/ adjacent
gaagraphieally must be friendly or made friendly by one means or
another. Markets for commodities must be established and main-
tained and expanded at each opportunity. Industries M tad
with the production of war material must be developed and increased,
If necessary these industries will be suptorted artificially in
order to insure that a substantial production capability
defense associated items remains in that area under the oolitical
control of the major rower.
This plane is the plane of emphasis upon the nationalism
within the major powers. It is the plana that views the Russian
attempts for control of the Dardanelles as an extension of the
ambition of the Tsars, as would be the conversion of the Balkans
into buffer states. It is the plana upon which the "National
Interest" is most easily tr ad into concrete terras. Control
of the sea lanes, free acce ,he Panama and Suez Canals,
continued receipt of middle eastern oil, of South African chrome
and Malayan tin are examples ei concrete items sought on this
plaie. Interests and succc Lures are re- ly
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simpler to determine for they are .aore i'iaite. One secure a one
tons of bauxite or one doesn't* this is the plane that justlfl
defense expenditures, and 5 iys ic... ing
of all (people and property) .ue coal oal
second plane of conflict is that wherein the cc
is viewed as that between met'. »r
communism contrasted against capitalism, whether the control of
the forces of production should rest with the state in
private hands* It is ttie plane of ideology where the culmination
of the prophecie, arx may or may **ot come true It la we ere
the juggernaut of history is i d to roll on and on, carrying
the foresighted and grinding down 1 trying to sU
dynamic. In contrast is a profit-incentive privately owned I
directed industrial system with a discernable degree of 1: .on
ano vision by government* Sfaflftl .^arx-Leniaism be ....-omulgated
uy the current prophets (vhic r assumes the role of fan
liaximus ) in an ever expanaing world revolution or shall it be
repulsed by the forces of anti-communism? Shall the eice
buok and Company or shall !• Magnin open stores in
i to scow and Peking? In tihis plane thf e. 4 apparency bulkier
and more comprehensive at one end than at the o Jier,
e third plane of conflict features totalitariani.
eonorasted against pluralism,i * i'his would apply both within
17* iee ?r
j
3 "Free HorX m*
and "itluralist/eionolithlc" into one plane.
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and without national boundaries. On one end i3 the uirnished iraa-e
of an international monolithism theoretically imposing by ukase
one way, one word, and one truth on subordinate nations and groups.
The tarnish appears as the result of the oino-ciovlet dispute which
appears to be over what one truth, what one way, what one word
shall hold sway rather than whether there is one truth, or two, or
three. On the other end i3 pluralism. Within nations diversity
of ideas, opinions, and interests are not only tolerated but
protected and even encouraged as a matter of vital principle*
Certain limits on action are established protecting personal human
liberty which limits cannot be broached except under the most
extreme and temporary circumstance. The limits are binding on
government as well as lesser associations. Diversity is respected
internationally as well. There is a recognition that each nation
has peculiarities of form and method that are advantageous and
suitable to that nation alone. There is a recognition that each
nation places different premiums on the achievement of varying
goals with varying urgency. One nation may be tolerant of domestic
diversity to a higher degree than another, and less tolerant of
international diversity. Or the reverse may be true, W'here
pluralism tends to avoid political interference in certain
areas totalitarianism seeks to become dominant in all areas of
human life where a shred of control can be exercised subordinate
to the political ends of the state.
A fourth plane of conflict is a cultural one. The phrase
"East versus stest" carries a significance more than a reference to
fltf?




European geography ; ost World War II, It carries the implication
of a struggle to maintain Western Civilization in all the breadth
of the cultural heritage transmitted by Europe from the past in
the face of a barbarism inherited from Attila. The complexion
of the "Third Rome" is colored not only by i'iarx, but by traits
peculiarly Russian, aid evident lc Core the storming of the
Winter i-'alace. Russian secretiveness was not a new phenomena. The
Okrana was in successful operation long before the Cheica or the
MKVD. The Russian desire to "catch up with the west" was a
feature of the regime of Peter the v'-reat and continued until the
time of Lenin when uore energy was put into the massive
industrialization program. In the words of Professor Toynbee,
"Thanks to eter's genius, Russia was prompt in
getting off the mark, Bfel began to run a tech-
nological race with the West ?*ore than a half
century before the Industrial jievolution got up
steam in Britain... since ^91^7 Russia has
redoubled her efforts."^
The west meant something far more than an economic system or a
political system. There was a concern with "modernity" and with
"science," but more than this was the aggregate, the Western way
of life. The opposing aspect on the cultural plane of conflict
is a murky view of a i3yzantine rule administered from a mysterious
Kremlin.
The cultural plane lends itself lea3t to a simple bi-
polarity. During the nineteenth century the center of the West
18. Stillman and Pfaff, op. cit
., p, .*£>
19. Toynbee, A. J. America and the »'iorid Revolution , p. 2?
^Hto04
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was in Western Europe and radiated from there borne by colonial
administrators.
These men carried with them ideas., beliefs, and practices
from Europe throughout Mm noa-western world* The ideas were not
restricted to techniques of mo.nlpulation of machines but concerned
relationships of man to man in society and in ^overran- nt. Lessons
could be drawn from not only their words but their actions as veil.
The non-western world learned enough to evict the European and to
take many of his techniques for their own use. The non-western
peoples can take or borrow from Russia some of the techniques and
forms devised through the Russian experience which in turn
carries strong derivations from the West as well.
Isolation of these planes of conflict may be impossible in
concrete instances. Like layers of plywood bonded together under
pressure with the strongest of cements, separation of these plans
can damage or distort a plane which by itself is fragile and
draws substance from the planes with which it is parallel,
Bi-oolarity transcends each of these planes of conflict
and manifests itself in differing degrees at different times.
The plane of contention as between two major world powers may be
regarded a central one, the one to which statesmen .mist return
periodically. It does not connote any particular system of
political or economic organization for within this plane the
major powers could swap political systems and their actions would
probably be substantially similar to their former courses.




the Mediterranean from the Black Sea? Would a Communist United
States be happy with a democratic Cuba 90 miles from her shores?
The courses of action would by no means be identical for the other
n.e-3 come into play and add a full nificance to actions
based on the big power plane. An African or Asian state would
have little inclination to become; involved in a struggle between
two far distant national states. The Afro-Asian has no concern as
to whether the American growth rate is larger or smaller than the
Russian. He doesn't care ^hich one is "one up" on tho other,
nor whether Berlin is garrisoned by American troops or S&rl
German ones. He knows big powerism, having within the lifetimes
of all but the very young seen a big power control his country and
teach him how wrong that was. The big power that he remembers
with distaste was a western power whose credentials of disinterest
are now somewhat soiled. U Thant, seemingly viewing the plane of
big power conflict, called for a "spirit of compromise" with
-e and take"20 on both sides implying that the big power
horse traders should get busy Ml trade, lowering prices or
trotting out new horses.
Bi-polarity may be isanifcsted in the protection of pluralism
against totalitarianism. Aid programs do not in all cases
promise returns immediately measureable on a yardsticK of big
power interest. The United States does not receive land lor a
military base or preferential trade rights in return for aid in
fy case, but an independent government has been strengthened
»
20 « Quoted in Handlin, 0» The Gullability of the iieutrals -





That government may or may not employ the forms and titles t
the United States does, but it nay be satisfying its peop"
as well. Ideologically an ai may be an ideoa ice
as well, but this would depend on i,he met.:od of its it and
the quality of ifcs presentation* Each American operation or policy
could be and should be evaluated as to its efficiency as an
instrument in each plane of conflict*
The planes of conflict do not necessarily find their
extremes in the United States at one end and Russia at the other,
in an absolute sense. In the plane of big power conflict other
nations will have interests as well which may have a bearing on
big power action or may not* An the Communist Chinese build
their industrial plant and garner nore power a third position
in rnore or less opposition to t,he other two will take shape.
Should India surge foward in t^rms of power or Brazil awake, other
and strong poles will realign the lines of force.
In the ideological plane the 3lno-Soviet dispute is causing
alterations at the one pole and repercussions all along trie force
lines radiating from that pole* The shape of these alignments is
very fluid and may not yet have taken a new permanent shape*
In the cultural plane the degree of opposition is less
finely made. Many elements of westernization are Integral to
21
Soviet doctrines, after all, •Han&am is a Christian here::
The search by non-western nations for the bits and pieces of
Vicsternism that will fit their circumstances continues apace*




Boti orn and Eastern advice is sought and the intermir.
of native, western, and eastern cultures demonstrate fluidity
of this plane as well.
The effects of actions in the other planes on the plane of
pluralism is marked. The Sino-Soviet dispute reveals a lesser
quality of international totalitarianism for a time as a function
in the ideolo ical plane. A relaxation in many human tens
within the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin indicates a
lesser degree of state rule internally although not a major shift
relative to the free world.
Each plane while conceptually separate interacts with the
others* Actions may occur which have effects within one plane
and do not disturb relationships in the other. Large ideological
actions nay stir little in the plane of national conflicts, and
interests. Within each plane ther continuous moveiiient, action
and reaction, modification and change. The rate of change may vary.
A new weapon may be developed and alter the big power relation-
ships and new positions are taken vis a vis the inventing nation*
This change may be reflected only slowly in the other planes if at
all, or may signal an opportunity and advantage to be pursued
ideologically. The missile ar>d space developments have been
loyed in this fashion. The military missile gap has apparently
vanished or didn't exist but the Soviet space achievements h
strong ideological utility.
Getting double (or quadruple) use from single actions
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i3 a nark of efficiency and toe expertise in international
affairs. Choices and decisions and policies should be evaluated
not only for their central theme, k^yed to a plane of confli
but for their "side" effects on other planes as well*
DM eight elements outl: .variously represent points
of a relatively fibred nature located in each of the pi it
assuming differinr *t in each plane •
passes such ti oint may shrink or swell in one plane and not
another, New elements may be introduced and older ones fade.
The constants are change, motion, tritoraetior-, and ty«
'p. affairs have assumed a "Teat sign: oe \n
American life. Domestic political problems have diminishod in
impact on the total population or a major part of it relative
to the scale of the Great Depression. Alth at
stil iics the United States the number of persons r vyed
is far less than in the 1930*3., Since 19!+$ considerab.i
has been expended in the presentation of the appetites of
Soviet Union as a nation and H ological aims of :'
international Communist r:ov which has not been without
effect. In 19U5 tihe first three nuclear explosions OCC two
oT these over cities. Although the possibility of a -an
invasion was miniscule, it \ nt that the cor :as
joined. In 19^0 a war broke out which took a marked toll in
-lean lives and sufficier/ -need the Congress
potential hazards that t for military expenditur
increased from ol3 billion in 1 :2 billion in l$$l to
billion in 1953. There was a decrease to $hp billion in 19>6
nous a &i
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bat the amount gradually rose to $£3 billion (estimated for
22
fiscal 1963* Peacetime conscription was a constant i a for
these years as well, unknown in previous American history. The
United states by these actions had certainly abandoned je-
tirae setting in the terms of U- *s. Kith the adv*.
the first Russian orbiting satellite. Sputnik I, in October, 19!?7 t
the Obitsxt States was within range of Russian firepower through
long range missiles which could not be intercepted by means
available to the armed forces. The question of operational status
and numbers of missiles had yet to be answered but the demonstra-
tion had been made* Presumably the U-2 provided the answers to
responsible American officials but such answers did not compete
with the sports pages for American attention* The inissile "gap"
became a political issue in the campaign of i960 and if attention
had not been paid before to this subject, it was then* America
was aware she was within range of weapons controller lie
country with which the contest was joined* The military alliance
structure had been created t »d the United States against that
country by defending otiv ... well as ourselves* Ho petty
antagonist was here involvea* After national and personal
survival had been presented M the stakes in tie conflict wherein the
action took place primarily in the field of foreign affairs a
certain interest and orientation toward these rs could be
exoected*
22. Goldfield, £* D, op, pit*, p, &8
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With the stakes ao high the effectiveness of our Tore:;
policy became a subject of oore issing interest to more
than a few. Was the United 81 -ing all it could to protect
itself and its allies? Were American policies wise, astute,
shrews? Mm the "yankee trade.' ing a saw horse or SfeMtb
long searching looks were taken at our foreign policy, forci.
policy apparatus, and at the states itself*
Critics of American for- olicy were legion, I&tptlMM
of American Foreign Policy :-ras blamed for everything from the
"fall" of China to falling arches, including world A'ars I and
II and the Korean War. One may question the degree to which
the 'Jnited States could have altered the course of all events.
In 1931* the Central Powers and the Jintente had little idea
that the costs of the war i^ould be quite as high or have such a
drastic effect upon them, for by no stretch of imagination could
the gains for either side offset the casualties or the financial
cost. The length of the war was not foreseen. The Germans
counted on a quick strike in both the east and the west and a
negotiated settlement which did not come.
I British failure to declare what Britain would do In
been credited with being a significant factor in the course of
events. Would Austria-Hungary have done otherwise in the light
of the values and principles of the time? While this .
historical speculation one may observe that the central focus
was in
, that the costs were not foreseen, and that the

2:
compositions of the governments involved varied con: ly#
One may infer that the foreign affairs ministries were staffed by
people more iircnune to popular desires than would be the case
today*
The United Kingdom had had a successful foreign policy to
that time. Peace had been maintained, a large empire had be
built and controlled* Control o3trained military operations
had been conducted throughout the ckpire* When Dreadnaught was
launched and made obsolete the capital ships of the Royal liavy,
land plunged ahead and replaced her fleet. The proper
decision for the time was made and executed and the Royal iiavy that
had enforced the Pax Britaiinia was once again in a position to
cany on. The precise decisions, what was done, is less significant
than the fact an operating fore nistry and central 90 iwrmnexit
made and executed policy which by tht light of their times was
sound and the best they knew* England was experienced in global
affairs and judging by results quiuo competent, Jhe had built
an empire second to none when this was her mind« JudgiBg by
results, World War I was an error* v"-ithout assessitig a degree
responsibility for the war, one >nay assume that some responsi-
bility existed and that this responsibility was a product of
the MM system, same general gpGVgl of people, and same ml
environment that was respons rlish successes* ild




Mr» Kennan opines some action should have been taken by the
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United States in 1913* He cites an article written anonymously
by an American diplomat in m ;h magazine as a co
analysis in 1913 of the "actual" re .rces and con, ns
at work and which would dictat-- .. ourse of events thro
1918, The advice existed., but was refused a forum in the 'nit'
States and presumably did not reach the eyes of the proper
American officials. Mr. Kennan opines the United States should
hav. i herself then (in 1913) and used the weight of '
inj to prevent war. If American influence was not success-
ful ("ignoring the nonsensical timidities of technical neutral it g")**
then the »toited States shou efrained from fighting but
acted as i .eman trying to moderate the actions of
belligerents, and then when the needs dictated, intervene to
save England. This appears to be somewhat close to the action
that the United States took. The United States did no,
but even Mr* Kennan. does not flatly hold that an ar erica
could have in this case effect
\
-e. He relates tne incite-
I a war fervor dedicated to moralistic ends, to highly
colored slogans involving the alteration of life among nations,
and cen*mres this on the ttoelfl that it forbade a reasoned*
negotiated peace. But, , docs not flatly hold that a
reasoned negotiated peace was in the absence ot such
motivation or that conditions on the continent xrauld have been
23. Ke man, American iJiplomacy, 1900, 1950. p. 62ff
2U. Ibid,, o. 63
..
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any better after the war. "...I fail to see ho-* it could have
.
ich -worse.," J is on for arming as no
conditions ir -men nations. The
a man's unha^ &stance Ira-
his capabiliti;. , . :5ns to censu.-
disappointment and unhappiness resulting from present!
the record o- ad What was ahlo
achl . This is a stan. 1 riticism of the realist,
last doe3 not maintain that the course of histor/
wou" Mi by American actions but only tl
di"'' Aaarioaa actions n alter ourse
of it • different station of war aims would
>sd less disappointra cv iness once 1 a-
^asured againsc tha at Ions. It would be
dif xjo disagree*
b pre? . remise that any
7 course of event; situation can be materiilly
altr . I not reversed by e sisa of American Willi In an
abc -se this may be .. » presentation by th
Ldered as reading a letter is "co ' a
ter* Abstractly this act z 3 in Itself
influence, Beyoad s, novevor, there mast b<-
finite cr at to the situation to alter it, and that
it must be proporti . % alteration de. of
- rpjicU, p» 61;.
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a type similar to the issue at hand (viithin the same plane of
conflict)* Simple fiats, exe. of will, should no
ton d adequate to alter a situation wherein other nations
roagfet far greater con tnl«04 it is desired to
alter just the ideological sit action* An ideological
ment, be it moral approbriu i aid bo considered as finite and
<thin b oation* - Ight may be
that of the sun on a spac ollite but even this causes
at in the appropriate situation, outer space, but not in
others* The difficulty is . -.rntification of tne weight
ind of commitment, is required \ ^-ove
what is desired,, It roust be reco niaed that soma results
re beyond the possibilitl s of human achievement . .
1 ] odge now available*
difficulty of identification emphasises t . ossify
for and honest w&l international (and for that
matter, national) affairs* ( MR'* illustration of
prescience in the American -c service is very central*
Lplomat presented a very accurate understand lag o£ one eourfid
of the future and a firm ;ras;> of basic reasons ibr
il* heard, was not sufficiently loud, or did not
cient weight, or ot reach the: is
voice should have reaches. fault exists it is not that
... I were not said, but that they were not heard.
According to Mr* Kennan* no American magaaine woulo t the
'
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articl. i rom a casual perusal of current periodic
do diplomat, or auyo. ® a would be refuse* /)»
>t be legislated. The di I . spoke out vdth





ais writer is w
of sat it 9%







complexity current, intemat/ional setting
dei city c. r of a
prir . the one so-le
in-. its and fc :'iela* .lather .ne
vie are eu ' tion and
of
lint intact and vital. The I
Can. ~d,
"»,.The tforla needs real d -'vise-
hood is just as rauch the ite of dialogue
.ole
.
dialogue is the kind betwx ople who remain what
:ire and speak " ^o
Requisite to isuch dialogue ifl ;peak out on not only
t principles, Etoq b@Oj is that people remain
that is, stand ti ition, advance it or
MHT it and nob Mask it* Uequisite Is a 8
±nr, their minds" i
id tarnish c
In order fo at to h In
ions must be . -tion of the right
t cxi;;t, but hat right rust be
Divr must not be Without her » iversity must be encoura:
99 contra: sniire:
con . -ly
and - nee* no monol-.
the rent monologue; ie as diversity o~
-
rariety of id caches neede
CO]: the complexity of forci s«
where better than in a demoer
of :'. ta& solutions be fo
^-mment more effective in provoking wm ideas and bringing
m to trial? There are c
tal organizations, from & -total it
-
i ithii
state, high! .-.i.an.. one
;i * '^aistance^ tiehellion^ and Death.
, p« 70
II bftfl
&truth exists and one alone. The ' ontifex Haximus of that truth
can- in error nor can i b-prophets vary •
, truth too far* depends on close adherence
truth*
-it truth . cast in bronze and it
vjubject to change* XI
some significant H«
se loon 1 as sac wed against American
aita far less than Ir&tiona? One would suspect
apparent stature of So .curaen is increased by several
Its of American disappointment veral units of mystique
off by the closed door and the Iron Curtain. The Soviets
have certainly grasped 1 ;f big power operations
(on
.g power plane of conflict) and acquired Eastern Europe
inciples.
The blockade of Berlin could be Marked as a "bi r"
operation without a proper &tt of the capabilities of a Hbig
ir nor the It! ical plane « When
the nature of the reply u la correct step would have
bee. :diately lift the blockade rather than continue the
.ess. Ferna, r, the I check
with the Soviet Air Force on air lift capabilities* a
-^loraat understood but couldn't be published in Pravda.
.tever the asides, a totalit - >t jjsmune
from error* Neither Posnan, Berlin, nor Budap
could be regarded as example MJt estimates and








have been masked and laid to rest behind the Iron Curtain?
secrecy achievable by the Soviets is often regard©
an advantage vis a vis the Uni «a« This secrecy serv
well to mask military shifts , ami shifts in policy as well*
This facilitates catching the Jni ,'.-ates off balance inter-
nationally2 ' or cloaks failures,, keeping a facade of continued
successes* It also hinders informi: jssla whi-
.1 have to execute that policy or contribute efforts toward
it. in some cases thl3 may be of minor significance, but in
others a source of major embarrasanent and difficulty in
executing the new policy.
In a democracy the informing process may achieve several
worthy advantages. In the absence of profound opposition
there is an implication of support* When people are consulted,
regardless of system, opposition on less than fundamental
grounds is often allayed, and willing support is gained.
Consulting the Senate by the aitment of Senators to the San
Francisco Conference of 1951 won quick passage and support for
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the treaty in the Senate. Through this device the President
Llllng support from both political parties, and the
benefit of advice from both parties sad from the iJeparUient of
State. He had enlisted the support and gained a concensus
among divergent groups. This spoke to the United Statos and to
27* In a temporary, tactical sense, perhaps, but if 1
:d analysis is correct, no major surprise nor im-
balance should occur,
i ?lischke, £« Conduct of American Diplomacy , other
: dances are cited as well including the negative aspect in
Wilson's failure to take Lo; Versailles.
itit t 'irt.x^ -v #v
^•dB on




those outside the United States that there was a unity of the -
country behind that policy, a guarantee that a whim of
tacvical advantage would not char: . credibility in perfor-
ce and supporting actions was established. Having previously
;he LI. S. Senate's lack of manipulability when firmly
convinced, the foreign observer could be convinced of the
genuiness of the commitment.
Consnitments of this sort are not immune from change. A
commitment to foreign aid has been made but certainly with
opposition. Increases or decreases in the dollar amount of aid
icance to one or more; countries may well happen, but the
policy of aid appears firm. Securing these willing commitments
seems to be a problem peculiar to a democracy. It is apparently
far simpler to direct that something be done, but the direction
excludes important considerations. The securing of the commit-
ment provides a sounding board for possible undesirable reper-
cussions domestically and abroad. If domestic problems are
created, the additional measures needed to solve these problems
are made apparent. Difficulties in execution of a technical
nature are illuminated, i.e., the capabilities and cost of an air
lift* When profound opposition is made evident, a compromise
be worked out prior to impleiaentation of policy, rather
than after the policy has been emasculated by half support. As
compromise is achieved, a commitment to the compromise is
achieved as well* A party to the compromise who fights the
















party to the compromise become "involved" in it, hopefully,
itivaly*
No more effective agent cou found that the man
involved in the success of a policy or commitment broadly based
on a concensus. The achieve a broad concensus way take
peculiar forms, even to the moral slogans of rir, Kennan* This
concensus adds an impetus necessary for the execution of policy
regardless of political system. Concensus achieved under force
will be less impelling than that achieved through willing
consent* Force may at times be applied to lesser agents for
short times in any systr. e desired temporary
results but for longer periods willingness and involvement will
i fertile* Willingness works when no one is watching,
adds the extra push, and stays the extra few minutes to finish
the job at hand.
For a democracy these involved men are necessary* These
are men committed to democracy and spawned by it* These are
men deeply committed to an ideal of liberty, diversity, end
respect for other men. With such a commitment these men will
work at democracy and make democracy work* No system can be
ver otive vhm the people within that system offer only
the to performance that is acceptable, which is the
product of supervision with a shotgun and a shotgun alone* A
: XX be effective when bfett people within that system are
sonally committed to that system, its success in operatin
its success in results*
i .: ;»-» imiMm auioboooO «fl^m IaoXj
.
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The successes or failures cf . ited States in the field
a policy are cont inu-lly open to question!" 1h©
question of the degree of succ failure must carry with it
the ti a under consideration, A policy
i of action:.; rcraun or a short time may have
th. irable long range ef ''net. unforeseen. If the
is short, very short, our policy may be effective,
jar vri J .can policy, and if this
xibs aren't dropping,, therefore American policy is
.ive. Certainly American policy has raore than this, bi
ev :<n of the effectiveness of any foreign policy must
indicate the span of time, wttethef a year or several gent.
lestlon of success should properly be raised whe rtta be
:d that an American decision was a hero the united
had. the requisite elements of power to in fact make a
decision* This determination of ability to decide must precede
a ju nfc of success or effect!?
questioning of succe effectiveness is necessary
to an effective policy. Continual questioning is part of the
dialogue that bring3 out the best. Errors can be re -jre
okly for they are apparent so hi joner and they becoina
:fter dialogue* The questioning process hopefully will
,-:ore true extent of the costs of programs in fc of
dollar's,, men, and principles. The questioning process can reveal
ore true appreciation of aims and achievements.
•.
• *»^1 I *-
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The questioning process can best be conducted in a
- where respect for diversity and respect for individual
combine , Continual efforts are necessary to protect and
foster such a climate but these efforts are included in the total
'orts to make the democrac ; vlat&Sa Only from this interaction
and dialogue fostered by the committed men can come the wealth
of ideas, solutions, end analyses vital to cope with the
complexity of international affairs, and give effectiveness to
American foreign policy»
th committed men, the answer is: "Noi"
.
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